Fictitious Capital, Felt Consequences: A Market Check-In for the Piramal Empire

Posted on 5th December, 2025 (GMT 02:58 hrs)

ABSTRACT

This letter-cum-article presents a public-interest reflection on recent market developments surrounding Piramal Group companies and the wider governance questions they have sparked among investors, analysts, and civil society. Drawing on publicly available financial data, media reportage, and long-circulating discussions in the public sphere, it examines the convergence of market underperformance, debt concerns, corporate restructuring decisions, and historical reputational debates linked to the group. The letter raises broader issues about transparency, accountability, political economy, and investor sentiment in contemporary India, especially in a climate where corporate influence, public institutions, and regulatory processes often appear intertwined. Without making allegations, the article highlights the anxieties and questions currently shaping public discourse—ranging from concerns about debt write-offs and governance norms to perceptions shaped by high-profile acquisitions and controversies. Its purpose is to invite open dialogue, encourage clarity, and reflect on how market narratives and public trust intersect in an era increasingly defined by corporate power and political proximity.

Introduction

This letter-cum-article is a public-interest commentary examining recent chaosophical “share” market movements involving Piramal Group companies and the broader questions they have triggered among retail investors, analysts, and members of the public. It brings together publicly available information—ranging from financial trends and governance-related discussions to long-circulating concerns within the media and investor community—to explore how corporate performance, political economy, and public perception often intersect in contemporary India. The intention is not to make definitive allegations but to reflect on the conversations already taking place in the public domain, and to invite a transparent dialogue on issues of accountability, market confidence, and the shifting landscape of crony corporate “trust”. The appendix portion following the letter-article contains latest available data (not conclusive findings) on the Piramal Group’s consolidate standing debt as well reflections on the deliberate confusing of the two terms “waive off” and “write off” in contemporary India to shield crony corporate MANeuvers (sexism intended).

Let’s tune in to the article-cum-letter now!

“These paper duplicates (i.e., stocks, bonds etc.)… represent nothing but a claim to a share of the surplus-value… They do not represent real capital but give their owners a right to a portion of the surplus-value.”

— Capital, Vol. III

  “arthaṁ adhyāsa iti, upanīyate ’nartham। anupalabdhaḥ mokṣaḥ॥”  

Sub: Bottoming Out or Taking Off? A Friendly Market Check-In from the Public Eye

Dear Mr. Piramal,

I hope this message finds you well—though the markets seem to be sending a rather different kind of greeting these days.

Over the past months, the apparent “bottoming phase” across Piramal Pharma (52-week low!)—and now the newly launched Piramal Finance, whose stock briefly rose before sliding over the past five days—has begun to resemble something more than a routine market cycle. To many observers, analysts, and retail investors, it increasingly looks like a broader moment of reckoning. Muted FY26 guidance, heavy market-debt concerns, the familiar “lumpy” CDMO narrative, and the unconventional merger–de-merger–re-merger sequence carried out without a traditional IPO have only intensified the speculation.

[Share market price screenshots taken at 05-12-2025, GMT 03:04 hrs.]

Compounding this are the long-standing, unresolved matters frequently circulating in public discourse: the old chatter around insider-trading allegations; the recurring Flashnet references; environmental concerns emerging from Digwal; the opacity surrounding the Shriram stake-sale; the debated DHFL acquisition; publicly reported electoral-bond contributions; and now, media coverage of the ED’s probe into loans connected to Omkar Developers—one of Mumbai’s most notorious real-estate fraud cases.

To be clear, I am not claiming these amount to conclusive wrongdoing on your part. I am simply referring to widely circulating discussions that continue to cloud investor confidence and raise questions about governance and transparency across the wider Piramal group.

I do not believe in the pseudoscience of astrology, yet I can still predict the following with unsettling confidence: the Piramal Group’s overall significant market borrowings (over ₹71,400 crore in consolidated debt per latest filings; actual figures may vary — see Appendix for detailed data) may — if India’s recent precedents are any indication — ultimately be cushioned, waived off (in the name of being written off? see N.B. section of Appendix), or quietly written off, much like the benefits enjoyed by several ultra-wealthy “wilful defaulters.” And why would such an outcome be implausible, especially in a political climate where the line between the executive and a single ruling party has all but dissolved? After all, publicly available records of Electoral Bonds and PM CARES contributions (bribery? patronage? strategic insurance?) suggest that entities linked to your conglomerate have donated close to ₹100 crore or more to the current establishment — a sum that functions less like charity and more like an entry fee into a patron-client machinery of reciprocity and silence.

As has occurred with other corporate tycoons, including your extended kin, Anil Ambani — such debt restructuring often translates into catastrophic losses for small investors, later rationalized as “collateral damage.” In Ambani’s case, at the time of insolvency, his companies reportedly faced claims of approximately ₹ 49,668 crore. The admitted claims recognized under restructuring procedures stood at ₹ 47,251 crore. Under the resolution plan approved by the NCLT, the group was required to pay only ₹ 455.92 crore — that is just 0.92% of the total debt claimed. The remainder (i.e., more than 99 percent) was effectively written off. Meanwhile, several banks (including SBI and Bank of Baroda) have classified portions of these loans as “fraud accounts,” citing diversion of funds and irregularities. The outcome demonstrates how major corporate debt — backed by personal or group guarantees, complex inter-company obligations, and opaque insolvency procedures — can be drastically reduced at minimal cost to promoters.

For small investors, depositors, or retail creditors who lacked leverage or access, such restructuring amounts to uncompensated losses, absorbed by public-sector banks, mutual fund investors, or insurance entities (such as LIC, SBI), thereby diluting private risk but cementing systemic socialization of losses — a pattern that should deeply concern anyone committed to transparency, equity, and accountability.

It is precisely this precedent that raises an unsettling possibility: that your own large consolidated debt might one day be MANeuvered toward a similar write-off or strategic absolution — not through transparent market discipline or fair insolvency processes, but through political proximity to the ruling establishment and the influential affinal nexus linking the Piramal and Ambani families, where financial immunity appears less a matter of legality and more a matter of access, alignment, and inherited privilege.

Therefore, this expanding consolidated debt — and the corresponding decline in stock market performance — may paradoxically function as a “good” strategic signal for you rather than a worrying liability, positioning you to perhaps secure yet another favourable intervention from the ruling establishment, much like the precedent set in the case of Anil Ambani.

But before any such hypothetical flight, a simple question remains—one that thousands of small investors still ask: why was the DHFL acquisition pursued in a manner that left ordinary people uncompensated while your group secured prime assets at a fraction of their value?

The numbers, unfortunately, have not helped steady sentiment. Piramal Pharma’s steep EPS crashes of –58.78% (Dec ’24) and –42.83% (Jun ’24), the rising debt commentary, six-month underperformance relative to the S&P BSE 100, and downward-tilting moving averages have led the market to “connect the dots”—fairly or unfairly—between financial performance and the reputational overhangs outlined above.

As an agnostic, I do not put stock in fate or destiny. Yet, I have noticed that some of your YouTube videos are flooded with comments from DHFL victims and other Piramal Group consumers, many venting their frustration in no uncertain terms. I make no claim that these public grievances have a direct causal link to your recent market performance. Still, one might imagine that, as an alleged insider trader, you could perhaps turn the tables by illustrating the chaosophical fluctuations of irrationally/delirious rational (a la Felix Guattari) share prices or the curious overvaluation of certain assets: this is inevitable in the ambit of recurrence of money commodity from M to M’ to M”… and so on ad infinitum to feed fictitious capital into the expropriative ΔM.  

DHFL Scam and the Piramal Empire: Chaosophies of the Share Market VIEW HERE ⤡

Which brings me to the question now circulating openly among retail investors and market commentators:
In a country where certain ultra-wealthy “wilful defaulters,” buoyed by political proximity, routinely secure write-offs, special treatment, or even make timely international exits, will the crony Piramal conglomerate follow the same script? (A well-timed stay at Stoke Park—golf course, Bond-film nostalgia, and tax-efficient structuring included—would make for a familiar scene.)
Or is this finally the moment when transparency, accountability, and due process decide to land?

Public discussions have long highlighted how prominent business families—including the Ambani-Piramal network—have expanded global footprints through acquisitions like Stoke Park, raising questions about whether such structures primarily serve community benefit or leisure class, parasitic lifestyles. Of course, the official narrative apparently maintains complete compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks—but the public curiosity persists.

And so the question practically asks itself: when estates abroad can be restructured in ways that generate such public scrutiny, what might genuine domestic accountability look like?

Mr. Markets (personification intended as a matter of sarcasm in the neoliberal plutocracy/oligopoly), as you know better than anyone, have an extraordinary ability to pierce through glossy narratives. Sometimes a “bottoming phase” reveals more about a company’s trajectory—and its governance story—than any balance sheet ever could. And in moments like these, investor sentiment and long-standing governance concerns tend to converge.

This note is written not in hostility, but as a reflection of what many are already discussing in the public arena—investors, analysts, activists, and ordinary citizens alike. If anything, I hope this moment becomes an opportunity for resetting the narrative with genuine clarity, accountability, and openness.

Hypothetically Yours,

Debeprasad (sic) Sadhan (patriarchal insertion!?) Bandopadhyay (sic)On behalf of Once in a Blue Moon Academia (OBMA)⤡

नमस्ते अस्तु मा मा हिंसीः

लड़ेंगे या मरेंगे!

इंक़लाब ज़िंदाबाद!

COPY TO:

1.    Shri A.H. Laddhad, The Hon’ble Prothonotary and Senior Master, Bombay High Court (Case No. S/42/2025)

DISCLAIMER:

This communication is intended solely for public-interest discussion, academic analysis, and fair-comment purposes. All references to events, entities, transactions, or individuals are based on information available in the public domain, including news reports, regulatory filings, publicly accessible financial data, court records, and widely circulated commentary. Nothing stated herein should be interpreted as a definitive/conclusive allegation, accusation, or assertion of criminal, civil, regulatory, or ethical wrongdoing by Mr. Ajay Piramal, the Piramal Group, or any associated individual or entity.

Any opinions expressed are personal, constitutionally protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, and form part of legitimate democratic inquiry, shareholder scrutiny, and consumer rights discourse. Where hypothetical or rhetorical questions appear, they are intended to express public sentiment and stimulate transparency-oriented debate, not to imply guilt, defamation, or conclusive factual claims.

If any statement is found to be inaccurate, incomplete, or misinterpreted, corrections will be duly considered upon substantiated written clarification. No malice, intent to defame, or attempt to prejudice ongoing legal, regulatory, or adjudicatory processes is intended or should be inferred.

APPENDIX

Piramal Finance Limited’s Consolidated Debt Overview (as of December 5, 2025)

Following the merger of Piramal Enterprises Limited (PEL) with Piramal Finance Limited (PFL, formerly Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Limited) effective September 16, 2025, all financial reporting is under Piramal Finance Limited. The latest verified data is from Q2 FY26 (ended September 30, 2025), as no subsequent quarterly results or material debt updates have been disclosed in regulatory filings or investor materials up to the current date. This includes cross-verification from BSE announcements, with no issuances, redemptions, or restructurings reported post-Q2.

Key Consolidated Debt Metrics (as of September 30, 2025)

Metric	Value (INR Cr unless noted)	Notes
Total Consolidated Borrowings (Gross Debt)	71,400	Up 24% YoY from 57,548 (Q2 FY25) and 4% QoQ from 68,767 (Q1 FY26). Funds ~78% of total assets (91,900 approx.). Small Ind AS adjustments on ECBs may cause minor variances.
Net Debt	64,162 (inferred as Gross Debt minus Cash & Liquid Investments)	Cash & liquid investments: 7,238 (including 3,505 undrawn lines, 7% of total assets). Provides strong liquidity buffer.
Debt-to-Equity Ratio (Gross)	2.6x	Stable QoQ (from 2.5x in Q1 FY26), up from 2.1x YoY. Net worth: 27,447.
Net Debt-to-Equity Ratio	1.8x (inferred)	Adjusted for liquidity; stable QoQ.
Average Cost of Borrowings	8.9%	Down 19 bps QoQ (to below 9% after 5 quarters); driven by diversified mix including ECBs and securitization.
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)	20.7%	Up from 19.3% QoQ; exceeds RBI/NHB 15% minimum. Supports growth.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)	235% (period average)	Well above 100% regulatory minimum; period-end at 702%.

Debt Breakdown by Instrument (as of September 30, 2025)

Diversified mix with ~20% from international/securitized sources for efficiency.

Instrument	Share (%)	Approximate Value (INR Cr)
NCDs / Bonds	37	26,418
Loans	35	24,990
Commercial Paper (CP)	10	7,140
External Commercial Borrowings (ECB)	10	7,140
Securitization	8	5,712
Public Issue	1	714
Total	100	71,400

Debt Breakdown by Lender (as of September 30, 2025)

Employee benefit funds provide stable, low-cost funding; shift toward mutual funds and banks noted.

Lender Type	Share (%)	Approximate Value (INR Cr)
Employee Benefit Funds	58	41,412
Others (incl. NHB 2%, FIs 3%)	12	8,568
Insurance Companies	11	7,854
Individuals / HUFs / Corporates	10	7,140
Securitization	6	4,284
ECB	1	714
Mutual Funds	1	714
Banks	1	714
Total	100	71,400

Additional Context and Verification

• Assets Under Management (AUM): 91,447 (up 22% YoY, 7% QoQ); 94% in growth segments (retail/wholesale 2.0), 6% legacy (down 55% YoY).
• Historical Borrowings Trend (INR Cr): FY23: 48,800; FY24: 53,500; FY25 (Mar 31): 65,800; Q1 FY26 (Jun 30): 68,767; Q2 FY26 (Sep 30): 71,400.
• Ratings: Long-term (ICRA/CARE: AA Stable; S&P: BB-); Short-term (CRISIL/ICRA/CARE: A1+).
• Projections: Management targets ~25% AUM growth in FY26 (to >100,000 Cr), implying potential borrowings increase to 80,000–85,000 Cr, but no Q3/Q4 details yet. PAT guidance >1,300 Cr for FY26.
• Sources: Data verified from Piramal Finance’s Q2 FY26 Debt Investor Presentation (Oct 28, 2025), Results Presentation (Oct 17, 2025), and Press Release (Oct 17, 2025), cross-checked with Q1 FY26 and FY25 filings on BSE. All values are from official disclosures; for live updates, check https://www.piramalfinance.com/investors or BSE.

N.B. THE CONFUSING GAME OF “WAIVE” OFF VS. “WRITE OFF” IN INDIA’S ORWELLIAN DYSTOPIA

A write-off and a waive-off may sound interchangeable in the age of India’s BJP-induced Newspeak, but they are not the same. A write-off is an accounting action: the lender acknowledges that the money is unlikely to be recovered and removes it from the active asset sheet, yet the borrower still owes the money. The legal obligation remains, and recovery—at least on paper—continues. In practice, write-offs allow banks and corporations to beautify balance sheets, obscure financial distress, and shift losses quietly without public scrutiny. It is a linguistic anesthetic: the wound remains, but the pain is numbed.

A waive-off, however, is the true erasure: the borrower is permanently freed from repayment, and the debt ceases to exist as a legal or financial liability. Unlike write-offs, which retain the façade of accountability, waive-offs dissolve responsibility entirely — sometimes through political intervention, legal loopholes, or opaque insolvency frameworks. In a system steeped in doublespeak and doublethink, write-offs are sold to the public as routine accounting mechanics while waive-offs masquerade as efficient economic policy. The result is an economy where private profit remains inviolable and public loss becomes normalized — a quiet ritual of redistribution in reverse, from the many to the few.

In truth, most of the so-called “write-offs” unfolding in today’s BJP-ruled political economy are not write-offs at all, but concealed waive-offs — permanent erasures of corporate obligation disguised as routine accounting procedure.

This is where the usual confusion lies — a confusion crafted and sustained by the present oligopoly in India.