Why Indian Political Parties Are Ecologically Indifferent

Posted on 31st October, 2025 (GMT 07:56 hrs)

ABSTRACT

This article examines the deep-rooted ecological indifference of Indian political parties across the ideological spectrum. Despite unprecedented environmental degradation—from the destruction of forests in Hasdeo and Nicobar to toxic urban air and vanishing rivers—ecology remains absent from India’s political grammar. The essay argues that this neglect is not accidental but structural: born of a development myth that equates progress with extraction and nationalism with industrial expansion. In a corporatized democracy, parties serve capital before climate, leaving the earth unrepresented in the republic’s moral imagination.

The crisis of nature can only be resolved by transforming the nature of politics.

1. Introduction: Ecology? Mercilessly Marginalized!

India stands at the crossroads of an ecological crisis—facing unprecedented air pollution, land erosion and subsidence, heat waves, deforestation, water pollution and scarcity, biodiversity loss, faltering coastal regions and the intensifying effects of climate change and environmental degradation as a whole. Despite these existential challenges, environmental issues remain conspicuously absent from mainstream political discourse. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition has made ecology a central electoral concern.

As philosopher Félix Guattari warned in The Three Ecologies, political reform without ecological consciousness—what he termed ecosophy—is a form of collective denial. This warning resonates profoundly in the Indian context, where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Narendra Modi has perfected the art of combining lip-service ecological rhetoric with developmental expansionism. Modi frequently proclaims that India’s approach to nature is rooted in “faith” and “culture,” framing environmental concern as a moral inheritance rather than a structural obligation. At the White House in June 2023, he declared that “the environment is an article of faith” in India, highlighting renewable energy achievements and India’s progress towards a net-zero rail network. Similarly, at the 2022 World Sustainable Development Summit, he asserted that “environmental sustainability can only be achieved through climate justice,” invoking developmental equity as the axis of India’s environmental policy.

Yet these proclamations coexist uneasily with statements that outrightly blur or deny the scientific and structural dimensions of climate change itself. In September 2014, Modi told a nationwide audience of schoolchildren, “Climate has not changed. We have changed. Our habits have changed. Due to that, we have destroyed our environment.” The framing recasts the crisis as a matter of individual behaviour rather than systemic economic and political processes. Again, at COP28 in 2023, he claimed that India “has set before the world an example of a perfect balance of ecology and economy,” even as independent analyses and opposition leaders pointed to forest law dilution, rampant clearances for mining and industrial corridors, and massive expansion of fossil-based infrastructure.

This oscillation—between moralized environmentalism and structural evasion—epitomises Guattari’s notion of denial. It is not a simple refusal to believe in climate change; rather, it is the reduction of the ecological question to a technical or ethical register that leaves the political-economic architecture untouched. While the BJP’s “green” policy language celebrates solar parks, green hydrogen missions, and electric vehicle targets, it simultaneously advances coal block auctions, river-linking schemes, and fast-tracked environmental clearances for industrial-corporate projects in biodiversity-rich or eco-sensitive zones. Behind the optics of clean energy and “climate leadership” lies an extractivist model of growth—the very “capitalist planetary schizophrenia” Deleuze-Guattari foresaw—where nature is endlessly instrumentalized under the guise of sustainability.

In this sense, Modi’s climate politics might be called performative denial: an ecology of spectacle that substitutes metrics for meaning, optics for obligation. Political reform continues without ecosophy, and India’s green capitalism flourishes in precisely the space where ecological consciousness should have begun.

In this context, the present article integrates theoretical frameworks, empirical data, and policy analysis to explore why Indian political parties in general fail to prioritize ecological concerns. Drawing on sources like the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s (2024) “Why Politics in India Do Not Rally Around Environmental Issues,” The Hindu’s “Climate Change: A Passing Cloud in Indian Politics,” and The New Indian Express’s “India Needs to Bring Environment Issues to Political Mainstream,” it reveals the structural, ideological, and institutional reasons behind the ecological indifference of Indian politics.

Recent developments illustrate this clearly. In the 2024 General Elections, for instance, none of the major political parties — including the BJP, Congress, and regional powers like the DMK or TMC — placed climate change or pollution among their top five priorities. Even catastrophic events like the Joshimath land subsidence (2023) or the Silkyara tunnel collapse (2023), both widely linked to reckless infrastructural expansion in ecologically sensitive zones, failed to shift the national debate meaningfully toward environmental accountability. Similarly, the Great Nicobar Island “holistic” development project, involving the felling of roughly 850,000–964,000 trees, has received environmental clearance despite severe biodiversity and tribal livelihood concerns. The Mumbai–Ahmedabad Bullet Train project — a flagship initiative touted as a symbol of modernity — has entailed the acquisition of over 1,400 hectares of land across Gujarat and Maharashtra, displacing thousands of farmers and cutting through wetlands, mangroves, and forest tracts. Environmental Impact Assessments were rushed through under diluted clearance regimes, and local resistance movements, including those in Palghar and Thane, have repeatedly pointed to the project’s ecological and social costs. The Bullet Train, like the Char Dham and coastal highway projects, continues to symbolize how large-scale infrastructural fantasies override ecological prudence in India’s growth narrative.

2. Empirical Overview: The Marginalization of Ecology

Independent content analyses of the 2024 election manifestos of the major Indian political parties reveal a consistent pattern: environmental issues occupy only a marginal share of India’s political imagination. One study found that the BJP’s manifesto contained merely ~11% environmental content, far less than economic or welfare themes. This imbalance underscores a deeper political calculus — ecology does not win elections. In a society where immediate livelihood concerns and growth narratives dominate, environmental protection is too often perceived as an elite, secondary, or “non-vote-catching” issue.

Party	Environment (%)	Economic Growth (%)	Welfare & Subsidies (%)	Infrastructure (%)	Others (%)
BJP	11	32	25	20	12
INC	12	28	27	21	12
CPI(M)	15	18	30	17	20
AAP	10	25	28	22	15
BSP	8	30	27	20	15

Party-wise Breakdown of Environmental Commitments

1) Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) — “Sankalp Patra / Modi Ki Guarantee 2024”
(Source: BJP Sankalp Patra reproduced in Kamal Sandesh special issue; kamalsandesh.org)

“Protecting the Environment — Our Responsibility
• The installed capacity of solar energy has increased by over 2300% since 2014 after the establishment of The International Solar Alliance (ISA).
• 10 million+ families can get up to 300 units of free electricity every month under the Suryoday Scheme.
• 36.86 crore LED bulbs were distributed under the Ujala Scheme.
• Net-Zero carbon emissions by 2070.
• India now has the world’s 4th largest clean energy capacity, 4th largest installed wind energy capacity and 5th largest solar energy installed capacity.”

Takeaway: The BJP’s environmental vision emphasizes short-term, shallow, symptomatic, technocratic, and programmatic metrics — solar expansion, LED distribution, and EV infrastructure — celebrating progress in “green growth” indicators while sidestepping the ecological trade-offs of large-scale infrastructure, deforestation, and mining. This approach, which frames sustainability as an engineering or investment challenge, privileges technological spectacle over ecological substance. Massive renewable projects, such as the Charanka Solar Park in Gujarat or the proposed 30 GW renewable energy hub in Kutch, are projected as global success stories, yet they often encroach on community commons and fragile ecosystems, reproducing the same extractive logic they claim to transcend.

Under Narendra Modi, environmental governance has increasingly been reoriented around corporate–state synergy rather than ecological democracy. Initiatives like the National Clean Energy Fund, Smart Cities Mission, and National Infrastructure Pipeline reflect this developmental paradigm: they rely on private capital, financial instruments, and land monetisation as vehicles of “green” transformation. Meanwhile, the dilution of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 2020, the fast-tracking of forest clearances for coal and industrial projects, and the expansion of the coal block auctions (2023–24) demonstrate a deep policy contradiction between the rhetoric of decarbonisation and the reality of intensified extractivism.

Moreover, the regime’s climate discourse is framed in civilisational-nationalist terms — portraying India as a responsible “Vishwaguru” leading ecological stewardship — while internally suppressing environmental dissent. The arrests of activists like Disha Ravi (2021), the harassment of organisations such as Greenpeace India, and the branding of local environmental movements as “anti-development” or “foreign-funded” all reveal a narrowing of democratic space around ecological politics. This selective ecology, in which the state positions itself as both saviour and exploiter, is emblematic of what scholars call “green authoritarianism” — a governance mode that centralises control over environmental policy while depoliticising questions of justice, access, and ecological rights.

Ultimately, the BJP’s model represents a technocratic–corporate compact that commodifies nature into data, credits, and capital flows in the name of “Climate Finance”, replacing the moral and democratic dimensions of environmentalism with managerial efficiency. This is not a politics of ecological transformation but of ecological simulation, where solar panels, highways, and riverfront beautification projects stand in for genuine systemic change. In this sense, the BJP’s environmentalism aligns less with environmental ethics and more with the global neoliberal trend of “green capitalism”—a political economy that markets sustainability as a growth frontier, rather than a call to confront the limits of growth itself.

2) Indian National Congress (INC) — “Nyay Patra / Manifesto 2024”
(Source: manifesto.inc.in)

“Congress reaffirms its profound commitment to rapid, inclusive and sustainable development, and to protect its ecosystems, local communities, flora and fauna.”
“We will prioritise measures to adapt to climate change, protect biodiversity, and strengthen disaster-resilience. We shall re-energise community-based conservation and empower local institutions in managing natural resources.”

Takeaway: Congress situates ecology within the paradigm of “inclusive sustainable development”, blending justice-oriented language with adaptation and community conservation. However, these goals are framed through market-friendly mechanisms — carbon financing, public-private partnerships, disaster funds — making the ecological agenda vulnerable to green managerialism rather than systemic reform of extractive models.

3) Communist Party of India (Marxist) — CPI(M) Manifesto 2024
(Source: CPI(M) Election Manifesto 2024 — sections on Scheduled Tribes / Forest Rights.)

“Withdrawal of National Forest Policy which advocates privatisation of forests and replacement with an appropriate policy protecting tribal rights.”
“Implementing the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, in full; amending the Act to include other traditional forest dwellers with 1980 as the cut-off year; no eviction of Adivasis from their habitat.”

Takeaway: The CPI(M) adopts a structural approach to ecology, foregrounding forest rights, anti-privatisation, and tribal protection. Its framework resists commodification of forests and defends commons against corporate capture — apparently an explicitly anti–green-capitalist orientation grounded in socio-environmental justice. However, its political practice has often diverged from this stated ecological ethics. The party’s record in West Bengal, particularly during the Singur (2006) and Nandigram (2007) land acquisition conflicts, reveals deep contradictions between its rhetoric of people’s rights and its pursuit of industrialization through Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The proposed chemical hub at Nayachar—later abandoned after environmental objections—further exemplified the CPI(M)’s willingness to prioritize capital-intensive, ecologically disruptive projects under the banner of “development.” These episodes underscore the tension within Left governance between redistributive intent and extractivist execution, illustrating how even structurally oriented parties struggle to operationalize ecological justice within the dominant growth paradigm of neoliberal capitalism.

4) Communist Party of India (CPI) — Manifesto 2024
(Source: CPI official site / manifesto PDF)

The CPI manifesto emphasizes environmental and agrarian justice, supporting small farmers, opposing corporate land grabs, and defending forest and water commons.

Takeaway: The CPI views environmental degradation as a class and agrarian issue, not merely a technological challenge. Its resistance to the privatisation of common resources aligns with a structural, anti-market ecological stance that prioritises collective control and livelihoods over commodified “green” solutions. However, while ideologically coherent, the CPI’s ecological critique remains largely confined to its agrarian and labour-centric discourse, seldom entering the mainstream political imagination. Its interventions on environmental questions are often reactive—focused on resisting corporate land grabs or mining projects—rather than proactive in shaping a comprehensive ecological vision for the nation. The party has not yet succeeded in transforming its structural critique into a sustained political agenda capable of mobilising urban constituencies or influencing national climate policy. This reflects a broader limitation of India’s Left ecology: though theoretically rich and morally grounded, it often fails to translate environmental justice into an electoral or mass-political force. In effect, the CPI’s position demonstrates awareness but limited propagation—an ecological consciousness without adequate political amplification.

5) CPI(ML)-Liberation — Manifesto 2024
(Source: liberation.org.in)

The CPI(ML) foregrounds anti-corporate, pro-Adivasi, and pro-labour struggles, explicitly opposing large-scale mining and land dispossession.

Takeaway: Its ecological vision is rooted in resistance to extractivism and corporate-state collusion, representing a rare systemic alternative to the dominant growth-centric paradigm. However, the CPI(ML)’s ecological politics, while ethically radical and structurally grounded, often remains confined to protest zones and movement spaces rather than institutional frameworks of governance. Its influence is strongest in regions of dispossession—Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Bihar—where resistance to mining, dams, and displacement is immediate, but it lacks the organizational capacity or electoral presence to translate these struggles into policy-level change. Moreover, its focus on anti-corporate mobilization sometimes leaves less room for articulating constructive models of post-extractivist development—such as decentralized renewable systems, local resource governance, or ecological planning. Thus, while the CPI(ML) represents one of the few consistent voices for ecological justice, its praxis remains more oppositional than programmatic, revealing the structural difficulty of sustaining radical ecology within India’s majoritarian and growth-obsessed political economy.

6) Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) — National and State Manifestos
(Sources: AAP manifestos — Delhi, Karnataka, national summaries.)

AAP prioritizes urban pollution control, waste management, and water delivery, focusing on visible improvements in urban livability (e.g., AQI reduction, free utilities).

Takeaway: While politically effective, AAP’s ecology remains service-oriented and technocratic — privileging city management and temporary relief over ecosystem restoration. Biodiversity, wetlands, and forests remain marginal in its vision.

7) Trinamool Congress (TMC) — Manifesto 2024
(Source: TMC manifesto reposts and press coverage.)

The TMC manifesto mentions river interlinking, coastal protection, and livelihood support for fishers, integrating ecology into regional development priorities.

Takeaway: Environmental commitments are inherently contextual and localized, often linked to state-driven infrastructure and growth initiatives, reflecting a hybrid discourse where ecological concerns coexist with developmental expansion. The Trinamool Congress (TMC) frequently frames its environmental rhetoric around coastal protection, river rejuvenation, and safeguarding livelihoods for fisherfolk, yet these issues are often presented within a growth-centered developmental framework. Projects like the rejuvenation of the Ganga under the Namami Gange initiative, the construction of coastal embankments in the Sundarbans, and the promotion of eco-tourism and riverfront beautification in the climate-vulnerable areas of Kolkata, along with the “smart city” of Rajarhat-Newtown-Salt lake, are positioned as simultaneously environmentally beneficial and economically advantageous. However, these initiatives frequently rely on top-down planning and public–private partnerships that risk displacing local communities and undermining ecological integrity in favor of visible infrastructure. The outcome is a narrative that advocates for sustainability while functioning as developmental pragmatism—where ecology is subsumed under state-led modernization rather than being embraced as a transformative environmental ethic.

8) Other Regional Parties (DMK, BJD, SP, RJD, BSP, JD(U), NCP, Shiv Sena, etc.)

Most regional manifestos mention the environment indirectly — through irrigation, afforestation drives, and pollution control — without articulating structural commitments like ecological limits, anti-extractive policies, or biodiversity protection. Environmentalism thus becomes a subsidiary, secondary, non-prioritized discourse nested within welfare, agriculture, or infrastructure narratives.

Cross-Party Analysis: Why Ecology Remains Peripheral

Across parties and ideologies, four recurrent dynamics explain the persistent ecological marginalization in Indian politics:

1. Programmatic vs Structural Measures:
   Manifestos highlight renewable energy, EV subsidies, or urban cleanliness drives — incremental measures compatible with extractivism and fossil dependency. These represent green capitalism: commodified “sustainability” without structural transformation.
2. Optical Ecology:
   Environmental performance is often symbolic and event-driven. For instance, ahead of the 2024 elections, Delhi’s visible cleanliness drives and temporary smog tower initiatives exemplified such optical ecology — short-term tech-quick-fixed visibility without enduring change.
3. Corporate Compatibility:
   Most environmental pledges invite private-sector partnerships — from solar parks to hydrogen missions — reframing ecology as an investment opportunity rather than a common good, reinforcing corporate-state ecological governance.
4. Electoral Incentive Structure:
   Environmental reforms are long-term and abstract; elections reward immediate relief. Hence, short-term populist measures (free water, power, employment) take precedence over policies demanding restraint, redistribution, or ecological discipline.

Case Studies: Ecological Crises and Political Silence

This ecological invisibility manifests starkly in real crises:

• Delhi’s Air Pollution:
  Each winter, PM2.5 levels exceed 400 µg/m³, nearly ten times the WHO limit. The Aam Aadmi Party’s “odd-even” scheme and the Centre’s Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP) offer temporary relief but fail to address structural issues — vehicular dependence, industrial emissions, and unchecked construction.
• Mumbai’s Rising Seas:
  According to the IPCC (2023), as much as 70% of Mumbai’s coastline faces submersion risk by 2050, yet coastal regulation and urban expansion policies remain unchanged, dominated by real-estate and port interests.
• Bengaluru’s Water Crisis:
  In the summer of 2024, the city recorded at least a 60% depletion in groundwater levels, with tanker dependency rising 40%. Still, water mismanagement has not become a decisive electoral issue.

Together, these crises expose the ephemeral political memory of environmental suffering — briefly acknowledged, then politically forgotten.

Synthesis

India’s political ecology thus reveals a paradox: while every party now “mentions” the environment, few treat it as a foundational axis of justice or governance. The majority deploy the language of sustainability to sustain legitimacy within an extractive, growth-obsessed framework. Environmental discourse becomes instrumentalized — a moral aesthetic rather than a transformative ethic.

Until ecological well-being becomes electorally consequential — until voters link climate vulnerability with livelihood and justice — ecology will remain the rhetoric of the margins in the politics of growth.

At the state level, data correlating governance quality with environmental performance show that progressive governance yields better ecological outcomes.

State	Governance Index (0–100)	Environmental Performance Index (0–100)
Kerala	85	88
Tamil Nadu	78	76
Maharashtra	70	72
Uttar Pradesh	58	50
Jharkhand	55	52
Delhi	80	81
Gujarat	75	70

Kerala’s “Haritha Keralam” mission and Tamil Nadu’s “Green Tamil Nadu” initiative illustrate what sustained ecological policy integration can achieve, but neither state is immune to climate-driven crises. In July 2024, Wayanad in Kerala suffered catastrophic landslides following intense rainfall—more than 370 mm over two days—revealing how even policy-forward states remain vulnerable when development disregards ecological limits. Heavy rains and red-alert weather warnings continue to trouble the district in 2025. Meanwhile, Tamil Nadu faces a constellation of vulnerabilities: frequent heatwaves, erratic monsoons, cyclones, floods, and landslides. The state’s Climate Change and Human Health plan lists numerous districts at risk of heat stress and climate-linked disasters. These realities demonstrate that ecological policymaking cannot substitute for structural limits on extractive growth; without robust adaptation and genuine structurally-oriented restoration, even the most progressive states remain exposed to nature’s backlash.

Environmental degradation also spikes outside electoral seasons, as seen with illegal sand mining in Uttar Pradesh, forest diversion for coal projects in Chhattisgarh, and massive tree felling in the Aravallis for luxury real estate.

Year Type	Deforestation Index	Crop Burning Index	Pollution Index
Election Year	65	70	75
Non-Election Year	80	90	85

This suggests that environmental action is often symbolic and strategic, driven by optics and not structural commitment — an observation confirmed by work on electoral cycles and environmental outcomes in India.

Recent analyses (Böll Stiftung, The Hindu, The New Indian Express) reveal that environment-related content occupies less than 15% of most party manifestos. Parties like BJP and INC emphasise growth, infrastructure, and welfare over sustainability. State-level data shows governance quality correlates strongly with environmental outcomes—Kerala, Tamil Nadu outperform others.

For example, the BJP’s 2024 manifesto mentioned “sustainability” primarily in the context of “energy security,” while the Congress manifesto placed it under the “climate resilience” subsection—neither foregrounding it as a national cum planetary existential crisis. The Aam Aadmi Party’s urban policies largely revolve around pollution control and water, with limited reference to biodiversity or ecosystem preservation.

3. Theoretical Perspectives

Building on these patterns of political neglect as well as indifference, a deeper theoretical interrogation reveals that India’s ecological crisis is not an isolated policy failure but a systemic byproduct of its political economy, developmental ideology, and institutional design. Environmental invisibility is woven into the very grammar of governance — shaped by what scholars call the growth paradigm, reinforced by short-term electoral logic, and rationalised through green capitalism and technocratic modernisation. From this vantage, the problem is not merely one of insufficient political will but of a deeper epistemic and structural malaise: the way the Indian state and its parties conceptualize “development,” “progress,” and “modernity” itself.

This section thus situates India’s environmental indifference within broader theoretical frameworks — from Meadows’ critique of infinite growth in The Limits to Growth to Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk society and the insights of political ecology — to uncover the ideological and material underpinnings that perpetuate ecological marginalization.

a. Growth Paradigm and Developmental Fetishism

As Donella Meadows et al. (1972) warned in the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth, societies pursuing infinite growth in a finite ecosystem face inevitable collapse. Indian political discourse, however, remains trapped in GDP fetishism. Economic expansion is equated with national pride, while environmental limits are treated as obstacles to modernization.

The Chardham Highway Project, justified under the rhetoric of religious tourism and national security, exemplifies this logic—carving through fragile Himalayan slopes despite multiple environmental warnings, expert committee objections, and Supreme Court interventions. The Central Vista redevelopment in New Delhi—a ₹20,000 crore vanity project—further demonstrates developmental fetishism disguised as modernization, prioritising architectural spectacle over ecological prudence and public welfare. Similarly, the Mumbai–Ahmedabad Bullet Train corridor, cutting through sensitive wetlands, mangrove belts, and fertile agricultural zones, has displaced thousands of farmers while being justified as a “symbol of progress.” In Uttarakhand, the incessant expansion of hydropower dams, roadways, and tunnels in already geologically unstable terrain has triggered recurring disasters—most recently, the Silkyara tunnel collapse and the Joshimath land subsidence—revealing how blind infrastructural ambition is literally eroding the Himalayas. Across states, this pattern repeats: from coastal reclamation projects in Mumbai to port-industrial expansions in Gujarat’s Kutch region and sand-mining devastation along the Yamuna and Ganga floodplains, the fetish for growth continues to masquerade as development, even as it deepens ecological fragility.

b. Short-termism and Electoral Cycles

Environmental change unfolds over decades, while political power in India is renewed every five years. This temporal mismatch discourages investment in long-term ecological measures. Politicians prioritise policies with immediate, visible benefits rather than those ensuring sustainability.

For instance, subsidies for electric vehicles or LED bulbs make good campaign material but fail to address systemic issues like coal dependence or urban sprawl. The National Clean Air Programme (NCAP), launched in 2019, set a target of a 20–30% reduction by 2024. Independent progress reviews show uneven results: while some NCAP cities met the target, many did not — one progress review recorded that only 41 of 97 reporting cities achieved the 20–30% reductions.

c. Ecological Modernization and Green Capitalism

The emerging rhetoric of “green growth” and “climate-smart development” reflects a neoliberal rebranding of ecology. India’s commitments under the COP28 declaration and the National Hydrogen Mission project a global image of sustainability, yet the government simultaneously expanded coal block allocations in 2023–24.

As environmental sociologists like Ulrich Beck and John Dryzek argue, green capitalism commodifies the environment — turning it into an asset class rather than a shared ecological commons. For example, the “carbon-credit” markets and corporate ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) reporting allow polluters to appear sustainable without reducing underlying emissions.

d. Political Ecology and Structural Inequality

The political ecology framework reveals that environmental degradation in India is not merely a technical issue but a manifestation of structural inequality.

Examples abound:

• Adivasi displacement in Hasdeo Arand (Chhattisgarh) due to large-scale coal projects.
• Erosion in the Sundarbans, where climate refugees face state neglect.
• Violence against anti-mining protesters in Odisha’s Niyamgiri hills.
• Manipur’s forest clearances for militarised development, displacing indigenous communities.
• Goa’s Mollem project protests (2020–21) against railway expansion through a biodiversity hotspot.

These cases show that environmental harm aligns with class, caste, and ethnic hierarchies — while political parties remain silent due to corporate-political collusion.

4. Analytical Dimensions

Three interlinked dynamics explain the ecological invisibility in Indian politics:

A) Absence of an Ecological Constituency:
India’s electoral landscape lacks an organized “green vote bank.” Unlike Europe or even in present-day South Africa, where Green parties mobilize voters around climate justice and sustainability, environmental consciousness in India rarely translates into political capital. The electorate’s immediate preoccupations—jobs, subsidies, caste, and identity—overshadow long-term ecological concerns, a pattern reinforced by media framing and campaign finance structures. Even when climate disasters such as the 2024 Chennai floods or the Joshimath subsidence directly displace thousands, they are framed in electoral debates as failures of governance or infrastructure rather than symptoms of systemic ecological collapse. This disjunction reveals how the environment remains politically invisible, lacking both constituency and narrative ownership.

B) Rhetoric Without Commitment:
While nearly every major political party now gestures toward “climate action,” “green growth,” or “sustainability,” these remain largely token inclusions—decorative phrases in manifestos rather than fiscal or legislative priorities. The Union Budget 2024–25 allotted barely ₹3,330 crore to the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change—a sum dwarfed by the ₹6.2 lakh crore defence budget. This disparity reveals a telling hierarchy of national concern: India is prepared to invest massively in war preparedness but not in planetary survival.

Such figures are not merely numerical contrasts; they signal an underlying political philosophy. Defence spending is justified as protecting sovereignty, while environmental spending—though equally tied to national security through food, water, and climate stability—is treated as an optional moral gesture. The state’s developmental narrative continues to privilege territorial protection over ecological regeneration, even as floods, droughts, and heatwaves claim more lives annually than cross-border conflicts.

Thus, the Indian political establishment’s climate discourse operates within a paradox: while invoking global climate leadership, it allocates resources in a way that prioritizes militarized security over ecological survival. Environmental pledges remain rhetorical—a form of soft power diplomacy—while the real political will and financial muscle lie firmly in building weapons, not wetlands.

C) Performative Shallow Ecology:
Environmental action in India is often choreographed for visibility rather than transformation. Cleanliness drives, “green” inaugurations, or temporary pollution-control measures proliferate during election years, only to fade once the cameras leave. The Swachh Bharat Mission, while symbolically advertized/projected as “potent”, prioritised quantifiable outputs—number of toilets built, cities declared “open defecation free”—over deeper ecological outcomes such as waste segregation, groundwater preservation, or sanitation sustainability. Similarly, Delhi’s pre-election smog-control campaigns and short-lived “smog towers” epitomise this optical ecology: a politics of appearance that substitutes systemic ecological reform with cosmetic interventions designed to project efficiency and control.

Together, these dynamics—voter apathy, rhetorical greenwashing, and performative environmentalism—constitute the triad of India’s ecological invisibility in electoral politics.

5. Implications: Political and Ecological

From an environmental sociology perspective, India’s ecological crisis is a problem of political invisibility. The environment is externalised as a background condition rather than a central axis of justice.

The political economy lens reveals that the growth-driven capitalist structure treats ecological degradation as an acceptable cost of “development.” The Adani Group’s port expansion in Kutch, the Great Nicobar mega-project, and Vedanta’s mining operations in Odisha typify this model — projects that are politically sanctioned and ecologically devastating.

Without ecological justice becoming a political cleavage — akin to class, caste, or gender — environmental policy will remain rhetorical. Political parties function within a short-term, growth-obsessed, and anthropocentric logic that is fundamentally at odds with sustainability.

6. Comparative Perspective: Global Integration of Ecology into Politics

In contrast, several democracies have institutionalised ecological consciousness within their political frameworks, demonstrating that environmental priorities can coexist with economic and social agendas when the political architecture allows pluralism and long-term planning.

In Germany, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens), born from the anti-nuclear and peace movements of the 1980s, have evolved from protest politics to policymaking power. As of 2024, they co-govern with the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, holding key portfolios such as the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action and the Foreign Ministry. Their leadership helped enshrine climate-neutrality by 2045 into German law, phase out coal by 2038, and achieve over 46% renewable-energy generation. These achievements underscore how sustained ecological participation within governance transforms environmentalism from advocacy to institutional practice.

Similarly, in New Zealand, the Green Party’s coalition with the Labour government (2017–2023) resulted in the Zero Carbon Act (2019), legally binding the nation to net-zero emissions by 2050. The establishment of the Climate Change Commission ensures accountability beyond electoral cycles—something absent in India’s politicised environmental institutions. The Green Party also shaped marine-conservation policies and biodiversity protection initiatives, embedding ecological ethics into legislative culture.

In Norway, environmental governance has been advanced through a combination of state-driven sustainability and cross-party consensus. Despite being one of the world’s leading oil exporters, Norway channels petroleum revenues into the Government Pension Fund Global, the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, which follows strict ethical and environmental investment guidelines. The country’s Green Party (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) and Socialist Left Party continue to influence debates on fossil-fuel divestment, electric mobility, and Arctic protection. This illustrates how institutional design—especially proportional representation—enables sustained ecological influence even in resource-dependent economies.

South Africa offers another instructive case. Post-apartheid constitutionalism integrated the right to a healthy environment (Article 24) directly into its Bill of Rights—making environmental protection a justiciable constitutional duty. Civil society groups like GroundWork and Earthlife Africa have successfully litigated against state-approved coal plants, using environmental justice as a constitutional principle. While ecological movements in South Africa often intersect with race and class struggles, they demonstrate how legal frameworks can empower grassroots resistance even in extractive political economies.

Other nations, including Costa Rica, which has achieved nearly 99% renewable energy generation, and Bhutan, which remains carbon-negative through its constitutional commitment to maintaining 60% forest cover, further demonstrate the transformative power of ecological statecraft. Bhutan has also took a firm stand against the GDP fetishism we just spoke of by implementing “Gross National Happiness” (GNH). These models reveal that political imagination—when coupled with structural openness—can reconcile development with ecological justice.

By contrast, India’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) system and centralised campaign finance rooted in opaque electoral bonds structurally disadvantage smaller issue-based parties. Without proportional representation or state-financed campaigns, ecological politics struggles to gain institutional traction. The result is a political ecology shaped not by sustainability, but by corporate patronage and short-term developmental populism. Thus, while other democracies embed environmentalism within governance, India’s electoral structure continues to reproduce a growth-versus-environment binary that renders ecological justice politically invisible despite its existential urgency.

Major parties like the BJP, INC, and regional outfits treat ecology as a peripheral, rhetorical add-on—comprising just 8-15% of manifesto content—prioritizing growth, welfare, and infrastructure over structural reforms. This “performative denial” manifests in greenwashing (e.g., solar targets alongside coal expansions), electoral short-termism, and the absence of a dedicated “green vote bank” in a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system that favors dominant parties. By contrast, Green parties worldwide—often thriving in proportional representation (PR) systems—have embedded ecology as a core, transformative axis, achieving policy wins, coalition influence, and electoral gains. Drawing on global examples, this comparison underscores how institutional design, economic security, and grassroots mobilization enable Green success, offering lessons for India’s extractive growth paradigm.

Key Comparative Dimensions

Dimension	Indian Political Parties (per Article)	Green Parties Worldwide (2025 Status)
Electoral Prioritization	Ecology <15% of manifestos; not a top-5 issue in 2024 elections. Crises (e.g., Delhi pollution, Joshimath subsidence) framed as governance failures, not ecological imperatives. No dedicated Green party; FPTP stifles niche voices.	Central to platforms; e.g., Germany’s Greens secured 11.6% vote (85/630 Bundestag seats) in 2025 election despite coalition losses, pushing renewables to 46% of energy mix. New Zealand’s Greens hold 15/120 seats (2023 election, stable into 2025), influencing Zero Carbon Act (net-zero by 2050). Norway’s MDG hit 4.7% in 2025 parliamentary vote (8 seats, first-time threshold cross), demanding oil phaseout by 2040. South Africa’s Green Party remains marginal (<1% historically), but constitutional environmental rights enable NGO-led wins against coal plants. Costa Rica/Bhutan: No formal Greens, but bipartisan/state-led policies achieve 99% renewables (Costa Rica) and carbon-negative status (Bhutan via 60% forest cover mandate).
Policy Approach	Programmatic/technocratic (e.g., BJP’s LED schemes, EV targets) with extractive contradictions (e.g., forest clearances for mining). Green capitalism commodifies nature; budget: ₹3,330 crore for environment vs. ₹6.2 lakh crore for defense (2024-25).	Structural/holistic: Germany’s Greens enshrined climate-neutrality by 2045 and coal phaseout by 2038 during 2021-2024 coalition. New Zealand’s Greens drove public service carbon neutrality by 2025 and algorithm guidelines for equitable tech. Norway’s MDG blocks North Sea drilling, redirecting oil wealth to ethical sovereign fund. South Africa: Greens advocate anti-privatization, but broader civil society uses Article 24 (right to healthy environment) for litigation. Costa Rica: Bipartisan NDC targets 9.11 MtCO2e net emissions by 2030; $60M FCPF deal for 12 MtCO2e reductions by 2025 via forest restoration (now 53% coverage). Bhutan: Gross National Happiness (GNH) integrates ecology, rejecting GDP fetishism for 60% forest constitutional mandate.
Institutional Influence	Marginal; opposition to extractivism (e.g., CPI(M)’s forest rights) diluted by growth alliances (e.g., Singur land grabs). No proportional seats for greens; corporate-state synergy dominates.	Coalition kingmakers: Germany’s Greens held Vice-Chancellorship (Habeck) and Foreign Ministry (Baerbock) until 2025 snap election ousted them, yet they backed €500B debt for green infrastructure. New Zealand: Confidence-and-supply deals yield ministerial portfolios. Norway: MDG’s 2025 gains position them in red-green bloc (100/169 seats), amplifying anti-oil voice in oil-rich economy. South Africa: Greens lack seats but federate via African Greens; influence via grassroots like GroundWork. Costa Rica/Bhutan: PR-like multiparty systems (Costa Rica) and monarchy-led GNH (Bhutan) institutionalize ecology beyond parties.
Voter Base & Mobilization	No “ecological constituency”; immediate needs (jobs, subsidies) trump abstract climate risks. Voter apathy in crises (e.g., Bengaluru water depletion).	Post-materialist/urban liberals: Germany’s 166,000 members (3rd largest party) draw academics/youth; 2025 vote down from 14.8% due to economic woes but resilient via Fridays for Future ties. New Zealand: 2025 “Green Budget” proposes $8B for sustainable jobs, targeting inequality-climate nexus. Norway: Urban surge (Oslo breakthrough) amid economic growth (environmental Kuznets curve effect). South Africa: Intersects race/class; limited electoral pull but strong in protests (e.g., anti-coal). Costa Rica/Bhutan: Broad cultural buy-in; Bhutan’s GNH polls 70%+ approval for eco-focus.
Challenges & Outcomes	Paradox: Rhetoric sustains legitimacy without change; deforestation spikes non-election years (80 index vs. 65 in election years). Progressive states (Kerala: 88 EPI score) vulnerable to disasters (2024 Wayanad landslides).	Economic trade-offs: Germany’s 2025 losses blamed on “deindustrialization” from heating laws; Norway’s MDG faces oil job backlash. Success metrics: EU Greens catalyze mainstream climate outlays; global Greens in 25+ countries average 5-15% votes in PR systems, vs. <1% in FPTP (e.g., UK/Australia gains via alliances). Outcomes: Renewables boom (Norway: ethical fund invests in green tech); biodiversity wins (Costa Rica: reversed deforestation).

Insights and Lessons for India

Green parties’ global success—evident in EU-wide surges (e.g., Spain/Greece gains) and non-European models (New Zealand’s 15 seats)—stems from PR systems enabling niche representation, economic security fostering post-materialist votes, and coalitions translating ecology into law (e.g., Germany’s 2045 neutrality). India’s FPTP and growth fetishism mirror barriers in FPTP nations like the UK (4 seats in 2024), where Greens rely on targeted campaigns. Yet, even there, they influence via “optical ecology” critiques, akin to India’s CPI(M) resistance.

For India, emulating global Greens requires: (1) Electoral reform toward PR to build a green constituency (as in Germany’s 11.6% threshold-cross); (2) Integrating ecology into justice narratives, like New Zealand’s inequality-climate link or Bhutan’s GNH (vs. India’s GDP focus); (3) Grassroots amplification, e.g., Fridays for Future India scaling to Norway’s urban breakthroughs; (4) Budget reallocation, mirroring Costa Rica’s $16.4M 2023 FCPF payment for emissions cuts. Without this, India’s “extractive democracy” risks deepening vulnerabilities (e.g., 70% Mumbai submersion risk by 2050), while global models prove regenerative politics is viable—even in oil-dependent Norway.

This contrast reveals ecology’s potential as a “cleavage” (like caste/gender in India), but only if institutionalized beyond rhetoric. As the article concludes, true shift demands voters linking climate to livelihoods, much like global Greens have done.

7. Recommendations

• Integrate ecology into electoral incentives: Voter education and climate literacy must transform ecological well-being into a political demand. Campaigns like Fridays for Future India, Let India Breathe, and Youth for Climate Action are pioneering this cultural shift.
• Institutional reform: Strengthen independent environmental bodies such as the National Green Tribunal (NGT) and insulate them from political interference.
• Ecological indicators in development metrics: Move beyond GDP toward Gross Environmental Product (GEP) models, like the one adopted in Himachal Pradesh.
• Support grassroots ecological movements: The Save Aarey Movement (Mumbai), EIA protests (Chennai), and Mollem campaign (Goa) show that decentralized, localized activism can influence public discourse.
• Democratise data and accountability: Public access to pollution and deforestation data must become mandatory; citizens should have real-time tools to monitor ecological violations. Audit reports and civil-society studies indicate that specialised oversight bodies and independent tribunals improve enforcement against illegal mining, underscoring the need for stronger local mechanisms.

8. Conclusion

Indian politics remains trapped in a structural inertia that views nature as collateral, a mere resource or free-gift for the capitalist economy— a background to be exploited rather than a living participant in the planetary future. Across party lines, the imagination of “progress” is still tethered to extraction, industrial acceleration, and electoral populism, leaving little room for ecological truth.

To break this cycle, ecology must cease to be treated as a sectoral issue or a matter of technocratic, market-oriented “sustainability.” It must be reclaimed as the foundation of justice, democracy, and collective survival — the terrain upon which freedom itself depends. Environmental responsibility is not an addendum to development but its very meaning: the measure of whether development sustains life or annihilates it.

Only when ecological integrity becomes a central axis of political debate — shaping budgets, ballots, and belief — can India move from an extractive democracy to a regenerative one, aligned with the planetary ethics demanded by the twenty-first century.

References

Aiyadurai, A. (2024, April 22). Why Politics in India Do Not Rally for Environmental Issues? Heinrich Böll Stiftung Delhi. Retrieved from https://in.boell.org/en/2024/04/22/why-politics-india-do-not-rally-environmental-issues

Bharatiya Janata Party. (2024, April 14). Modi Ki Guarantee: Sankalp Patra 2024 (English PDF). New Delhi: BJP. Retrieved from https://www.bjp.org/files/inline-documents/Modi-Ki-Guarantee-Sankalp-Patra-English_0.pdf

Down to Earth. (2024, July 25). Budget 2024–25: Environment ministry allocation sees slight increase. Retrieved from https://www.downtoearth.org.in/wildlife-biodiversity/budget-2024-25-environment-ministry-allocation-sees-slight-increase

Greenpeace India. (2025). How are Climate Budgets Allocated. Retrieved from https://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/story/17487/how-are-climate-budgets-allocated/

Indian National Congress. (2024, April 5). Nyay Patra: Congress Manifesto 2024 (English PDF). New Delhi: INC. Retrieved from https://manifesto.inc.in/assets/Congress-Manifesto-English-2024-Dyoxp_4E.pdf

India Spend. (2024). How India Budgets for Changing Climate. Retrieved from https://www.indiaspend.com/budget/how-india-budgets-for-changing-climate-940335

India. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. (2025). Annual Report 2024–25. New Delhi: MoEFCC. Retrieved from https://moef.gov.in/uploads/pdf-uploads/English_Annual_Report_2024-25.pdf

India. Ministry of Finance. (2024). Union Budget 2024–25: Ministry-wise Summary of Budget Provisions. New Delhi: Government of India. Retrieved from https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2024-25/

Simon, A. D. (2023). Why India Never Turned to Green Politics. Asia in Global Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.asiainglobalaffairs.in/Commentary/why-india-never-turned-to-green-politics/

The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI). (2025). Decoding the Union Budget 2025: A Green Lens on Energy Resilience and Sustainable Development. Retrieved from https://www.teriin.org/press-release/decoding-union-budget-2025-green-lens-energy-resilience-and-sustainable-development

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