“Gods” (or Deities?) as Juristic Persons: Critiquing the Hindutva Idolatry
“Gods” (or Deities?) as Juristic Persons: Critiquing the Hindutva Idolatry
“Gods” (or Deities?) as Juristic Persons: Critiquing the Hindutva Idolatry
Posted on 27th October, 2024 (GMT 20:00 hrs)
ABSTRACT
The article critiques the legal recognition of Hindu deities as juristic persons, a concept used to grant Hindu idols legal rights similar to those of humans or corporations. It argues that this practice, which began under British colonial law, has been appropriated by Hindutva forces to reinforce idolatry and elevate religious sentiments over secular law. By treating deities as legal entities, the article suggests that Hindutva ideology gains leverage in the Indian judicial system, promoting a particular brand of religious identity that influences political and social dynamics. The author calls for a critical examination of this conflation of religion and legal identity, questioning its compatibility with India’s secular framework.
Amidst the increasing infestation of the “Republic of India” by agencies and associates of a specific religious colour and identity, viz., the growing bull-dozing Saffronization of all life and society indiscriminately, we have come across the usage of a particular term that must be taken care of in the course of consistently carrying out debates centering on the necessity for secularism, or “secularity” as such, especially in drawing the overlapping boundaries between the realms of law, the fascist governmentality and the public sphere(s). In the course of composing this article, the authors have maintained an open-minded and agnostic stand, methodologically speaking, in order to exploit conflicting perspectives and/or stands in so far as the questions of God’s existence and idolatry are concerned, in a manner that preserves contingencies in making truth-claims.
The term occurs widely in the legal discursive formation, which makes it controversial at its core, since it would otherwise seem that the secularized [in Gouldner’s (1979) sense⤡] “law of the land” should not permit the existence of such a term in the first place.
The term we are referring to and dealing with is: “God as a juristic person”, or rather, perhaps more accurately, “Deity as a juristic person” (the differentiation or compartmentalization of these two terms shall become clear soon).
In this context, as evident from the term itself, the divine power, be it the God or the given deity, is provided or vested with a legal agency, a legal personhood.
We used “provided or vested with” in the above sentential context, given that the personhood in question is a stipulated personhood, an arbitrary creation of law, an artificial imposition of person-ality onto an otherwise questionable entity (note that the term “persona” is used in denoting the masks worn by theatre actors, shielding their “real” faces through dramaturgical interplays, of role-playing “another”).
In the officialized documentation, such a “legal” personhood is sharply distinguished from the notion of supposed “natural” personhood, such as that of human persons. In the same vein: rivers1, the entire animal kingdom and corporations/companies are also treated as “persons”.
Are these instances not some form of person-ification that stem from the spectrum of anthropomorphic projection (Samaśokti Alaṁkāra)? In fact, this phenomenon also appears to be an anthropocentric evaluation, in which the distinctively human gaze shapes apparent “external” realities due to the fact of the limitations of the boundedly anthropic frame of reference. Do the terms “God” and/or “deity” affirm any such external, independent reality, at all? The affirmation in this case has to (in terms of logical implication) figure in some sort of relation of correspondence, in which the signifier term stands for or serves a representative function (which sometimes takes the form of “mirroring” or “picturing”) to a singular or set of existent (in the past, present or future/historic in Austin) state of affairs or objects. We will get back to this point at the relevant juncture.
This term was first introduced in the British Colonial era itself. Why so? It is often said that since the Hindu temples owned a huge amount of land and resources (private property in general), the then British administrators decided that the legal owner of the wealth was to be identified as none other than the deity, with a shebait or manager acting merely as the trustee (as distinguished from the absolute, undisputed owner) in that regard. It is quite obvious here that the term is applied exclusively in the cases of Hindu Gods and Goddesses, and not in the case of “other” religions. The British judges in the late 19th century did this while confronting the task of applying Hindu laws to religious endowments. Note the term “devottara sampatti” (“Debutter property”, i.e., property belonging to a Hindu deity) in this connection, which are not allowed to be sold.
What if the parties involved in a legal suit or conflict believe that a shebait is not acting in the deity’s best interests? In that case, the law further says, they may take legal action. In Bishwanath And Anr vs Shri Thakur Radhaballabhji & Ors (1967), the Supreme Court permitted a “suit filed by the idol represented by a worshipper” when the shebait was found “alienating the idol’s property.” The court held that if a shebait fails to fulfill their responsibilities, a devotee can approach the court as a “friend of the deity.” Is not this entire enterprise arbitrary at best? The extent of legal anthropomorphization could be seen in Justice Mukerji’s (sic) ruling in Rambrahma v. Kedar Nath Banerjee (1922), which offered insight into how an idol came to be recognized as a juristic person under the law. The Court noted that the idol’s daily life was observed with precise detail: it was treated to all essential and luxurious aspects of existence, including regular changes of attire, offerings of both prepared and raw food, and a dedicated time for rest. How can one distinguish between a child’s play with dolls and this kind of adult puppet-worship or heathen attitude? We sincerely wonder!
In essence, the origins of this concept can be traced back to Roman law. Here, when property was designated for a specific religious or charitable purpose without a named beneficiary, the purpose itself was elevated to the stature of a legal foundation. This transformed the foundation into an independent legal entity, one that held ownership of the dedicated property in its own right.
In the 2010 Allahabad High Court decision on the Ayodhya title suit, Justice D.V. Sharma explained that, just as a guardian is appointed for minors, a Shebait or manager is designated to represent an idol, giving them authority to oversee the deity’s affairs. Similarly, the Bombay High Court, in its 1887 ruling on the Dakor Temple case, declared that “Hindu idol is a juridical subject and the pious idea that it embodies is given the status of a legal person.” This notion was upheld in a 1921 judgment in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha vs Balusami Ayyar, where the court stated that “under the Hindu law, the image of a deity… (is) a ‘juristic entity’, vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property.”
“A juristic entity or person is one in whom the law reposes rights or duties in its own name. A company is a juristic person, who can hold or deal with property in its own name,” Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde said. “While God as an abstract concept is not a juristic entity, deities in Hindu law have been conferred personhood, as capable of being bestowed with property, or leading it out or suing to take back possession. (…) “Thus, by a legal fiction”, Hegde said, “installed deities at Hindu places of worship have been treated like other real persons for the purpose of law.” ⤡
Interestingly, not all idols are conferred the tag of “juristic person”. An idol only attains the status of a ‘juristic person’ only after undergoing a formal consecration, or Prāṇa Pratiṣṭhā (establishment of life in the idol). In the 1969 case Yogendra Nath Naskar vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, the Supreme Court clarified: ‘It is not all idols that will qualify for being “juristic person” but only when it is consecrated and installed at a public place for the public at large.”
Mosques and churches/cathedrals are not regarded as juristic persons because they are not objects of worship themselves. Instead, they serve as places (often as sacred grooves) where believers gather to offer their prayers. If is it so,
In the case Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee vs Som Nath Dass (2000), the Supreme Court of India ruled that the “Guru Granth Sahib… cannot be equated with other sacred books… Guru Granth Sahib is revered like a Guru… (and) is the very heart and spirit of gurudwara. The reverence of Guru Granth on the one hand and other sacred books, on the other hand, is based on different conceptual faith, belief and application.” However, the court clarified: “…every Guru Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic person unless it takes a juristic role through its installation in a gurdwara or at such other recognised public places.”
However, on the contrary, Sikhs are included under the Hindu umbrella as per the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) and Hindu Succession Act (1956) along with Buddhists and Jains. Why this contradiction regarding what falls under the “Hindu” designatum and what does not? Is it due to the fact that the term “Hindu” itself was hurriedly evolved in the colonial period as a mirror-image of Judeo-Abrahamic organized religions within the narrative of divide-and-rule “I/us and them” (Cf. Said’s excellent discussion on “Good Orient” vs. “Bad Orient”, What is to be noted here that in the case of philological context, especially in the genealogical classification of languages on the basis of cognate-affinity, Islam is considered as “Bad Orient” and in the case of monotheism, Islam is considered as “Good Orient”; 1978 ⤡), and therefore, still exhibits many features of forced standardization? That indeed appears to be the case.
Now, when one uses the mutually associated terms “person”, “entity”, “self”, “being” etc., one does not exactly confer identical or even synonymous relations between them. In fact, there are subtle ontological and ontic distinctions that hold between the deployment of these terms, with differing conceptual schemes holding appropriate in each case, howsoever similar they might seem in the first glance. While “entity” refers to a generic usage, “self” carries out a specific metaphysical (statutory warning: *be aware of metaphysics”, as pointed out by the Logical Positivists2) connotation (given that post-analytic philosophy no longer uses the said term), and “being”, as interpreted in Heidegger’s demarcation between “beings” and “Being” (a constitutive mode of existence for the being), especially “Dasein” (“The” Special Being) is interpreted to be standing for the entity that is conscious of (and can make an “issue” out of) the meaning and purpose of its existence in terms of a “whatness” of its existential loci.
For the time being, let us concern ourselves with the term “person”. What does the philosophical lensing mean by it, generally speaking?
Joseph Fletcher⤡ (as further interpreted by Peter Singer⤡) laid down the following indicators of “person” or “personhood”.
A person is one who:
- is self-aware/has self-awareness
- has self-control
- has a sense of future
- has a sense of past in terms of memory retention
- has the capacity to relate to other beings
- has the ability to feel concern for others
- has defined communication abilities or the capacity of articulated linguistic speech
- has curiosity
None of the above conditions are satisfied in the case of the “deity” in particular, i.e., the puppet-idol of a particular deity like Rāma⤡ ⤡ ⤡ ⤡,, Gaṇeśa⤡ or Kṛṣṇa et al (better to use “etc.”). Moreover, if one problematizes the existence of God itself, one fails to apply the feature of personhood further in the absence of a substratum. P. F. Strawson (1959⤡) argued that the concept of “person” is primitive, explaining how physical and conscious/mental traits/characteristics are ascribed to one entity. He simultaneously critiqued the Cartesian “ownership” (svatva) as well as the so-called “no-ownership” views, asserting that they both fail to explain how both physical and mental states are attributed to a single being in the course of linguistic or rather speech acts. Can such ascriptive states be assigned to the “Gods” or “deities” in this connection?
Yet, as a juristic person, the idol has the following “rights”:
- Ownership of property and Wealth
- Paying taxes (In Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1969, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Hindu deities are considered “persons” under Section 2 of the Income Tax Act. This allows them to be recognized as assessable entities under the Act, making it possible to tax them through their representatives, such as shebaits or managers.)
- Suing and being sued
In the Sabarimala case (2018), one argument against permitting women of menstruating age to enter the temple was that doing so would infringe on Lord Ayyappa’s “right to privacy”, as he is considered to be eternally celibate. In the Sabarimala judgment, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (2018) noted: “Merely because a deity has been granted limited rights as juristic persons under statutory law does not mean that the deity necessarily has constitutional rights.”
How come a non-self aware, unconscious puppet-idol possess rights? The ethical discourse on rights, even if it be only property rights (instead of constitutional rights) only argues in favour of the admissibility of rights along with correspondent duties in the case of those who can yield a conscious agency and project future possibilities (though this notion has suffered due to alternative non-speciesist perspective that promote moral rights, moral standing and moral agency to even non-sentient components of nature). The deity can do no such thing!
In talking of “God” as opposed to “Deity”, what kind of relation is shared by these two terms with their given semanticities?
“God” usually (with reservations; but generalizable ad argumentum) refers to the principle of ultimate reality, the supreme divine “first” principle that is given the status of the creator-sustainer-destroyer of the universe (without referring to the Deist, Panentheist or Acosmist perceptions as of now). Therefore, it usually has a peculiar “super-natural” or transcendental “other-worldly” import. Hence, God is projected as the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent entity, who is more-or-less beyond the finitude of the material realm. According to the law as it stands today in the Indian republic, such a conception of “God” is not vested with any juristic persona, given the absence of physical boundedness or territoriality of functioning. Since, once such God is identified in or with a particular given manifest alone, his/her/their eternality and almighty power are said to suffer.
Deity, on the other hand, have particular defined operational roles in relation to the world such as ameliorating troubles from human life, maintaining agricultural and human fertility or material prosperity, maintaining the seasonal patterns, manifesting certain natural phenomenon/natural forces such as thunder-lightning and so on. There is often a hierarchy of such deities, with the higher-order deities being granted a relatively privileged space than the deities under him/her/them. Apart from the Judeo-Abrahamic Monotheistic understandings, the apparently “polytheistic” Hinduism (which is far from being an unitary organized religion but is an umbrella term with many heterogeneities and inherent contradictions) started out with such anthropomorphic deities selfishly suited to various human purposes in this earthly life instead of (once and for all) positing any “one” impartial, impersonal reality, which was a much later addition in the course of the development of Advaita Vedānta literature. Hence, what is retrospectively denoted as “Hinduism” per se had ample scope for worship that emerges solely from cowardice and a culture of fear, loss and helplessness in the context of contemporary India⤡. A distinctive feature of such worship lies in “prayers” and ritual performances with offerings made to these deities, which evidently posits how an act of praying is but an imaginary, artificialized psychological crutch, which is also openly practiced by our about-to-retire CJI, Mr. D. Y. Chandrachud, who represents the so-called “independent”, “value-neutral” judiciary⤡ !⤡ Thereof, these deities as individuated idols were often told to be the representative incarnations or particular manifests of the Supreme God(s) with a delineable physical form.
Visionaries such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy attempted a “retreat” to the monotheistic conceptualization as being the “authentic” (or authenticated crux) form of “Hinduism” by opposing deity-worship and the blind faith-based idolatry involved therein, taking cue from Islam and Christianity in the process. In fact, it was often said that the deities were nothing other than “elevated” or “magnified” humans (not exactly the Nietzschean “over-man” or Übermensch per se⤡, though there are conceptual intersections), who have consummated the process of “Divi Ārohaṇa“, which is mentioned in the accounts of Rahul Sankrityayana⤡ and Samaresh Basu (Shambo, 1978). This point was also emphasized earlier by David Hume⤡ in his studies on “natural religion” as opposed to “revealed religion”. In the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā school of Indian philosophy, the existence of God was rebutted by postulating the autonomy of the dynamic law of karma that does not need any supernatural entity for its function and monitoring, while specific deities merely as witnesses and validators of ritual performances by humans were admitted. This also marks the observable divergence of the two terms.
In the highly debatable Ayodhya Ram Mandir verdict (2019)⤡ which made mentions of “deity as juristic person” instead of God as juristic person in mentioning “Ramlala Virajman“, it was mentioned that:
“Divinity in Hindu philosophy is seamless, universal and infinite. Divinity pervades every aspect of the universe. The attributes of divinity defy description and furnish the fundamental basis for not defining it with reference to boundaries — physical or legal. For this reason that it is omnipresent, it would be impossible to distinguish where one legal entity ends and the next begins”.
Is it really the case?
In answering the above question, it must be kept in mind that the term “Hindu philosophy” is a misnomer⤡, and there is no such thing. What exists is the South-East Asian philosophical literature, which is vastly plural in character and can never be exclusively reduced to any one religion’s ramblings. What we need to observe here is that there are many uncontradictory contradictions among three identifiable spaces of “Hindutva” as such: the public sphere characterized by plural Hindutvas, which are quite contrary to the politically motivated Hindutvavadin’s monomorphic ethnographic Hindutva. These two spheres are also far from the South-East Asian epistemological pursuits.
We must delve into the essence of “Indian” (though such an imaginary modular construct of a geo-political identity did not exist at the time) philosophy, critiquing its misrepresentation as a ‘spiritual’ culture, particularly by derivative interpretations in secondary commentaries or sources. It is to be argued that the core “Indian” philosophical schools often harbor anti-spiritual, agnostic, sceptic or even atheistic foundations, with “Adhyātmikatā” (often translated as “spirituality”) actually suggesting a form of “dejection of self”, pointing to an intra-organic suffering pertaining to human being-in-the-world, which diverges from the Western notion of “spirit-uality”, characterized by notions of self-enlightenment or any kind of divinely ordained connection.
Given below is a highly concise examination of different schools of “Indian philosophy”⤡ (philosophy cannot be confined to a particular geo-political area, though ethnocentrism must also be considered to understand the epistemological pursuit with particular milieu or non-discursivity) that challenge or reject theism (please note that the nine schools enlisted here are not exhaustive of “all” “Indian” philosophy, since there are many other sub-schools/upa-prasthāna and distinct cults that exist as well, as pointed out in Sāyaṇa-Mādhavacārya‘s Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha):
- Sāṁkhya Darśana: Denies the existence of God, citing lack of proof: “Īśvarāsiddhe Pramāṇabhāvāt Na Tat Siddhiḥ”, i.e., God is non-existent due to the lack of valid proofs in favour of his existence.
- Yoga Darśana: Recognizes ‘God’ as a metaphor for knowledge and wisdom, not as a world-creator deity.
- Nyāya Darśana: Refutes supernatural beliefs, focusing on empirical inquiry. There is nothing called ‘God’ within the categorized padarthas. In the Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya to Gautama’s Nyaya Sutra, it was said that: “…you cannot get a son by simply performing Putreṣṭi Yajña” (ceremonial ritual for getting ‘male’ child.). However, Nyāya philosophy as interpreted in Udyotkara and Jayantabhaṭṭa’s treatises, posit nine major arguments in favour of God’s existence, including the teleological argument, the argument from Adṛṣṭa and so on. In the Navya-Nyāya Darśana of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, God did not have an independent ontological status and instead was equated with hyphenated space-time.
- Vaiśeṣika Darśana: Introduces an “external power” that regulates atomic activity, but this power is distinct from traditional or conventional divine figures.
- Pūrva Mīmāṁsā: As noted earlier, prescribes rituals to satisfy the classes of demi-gods/rulers without necessitating any belief in God, systematically negating divine existence.
- Vedānta (Uttara Mīmāṁsā): Although there are 10+ schools within the “Vedanta” umbrella, we will be focusing only on the Advaita Vedānta school here. In Śaṅkara’s philosophy, God with attributes or qualifications (Saguṇa Brahman/Īśvara) is conceived as a ‘false-state’ (cf. Māṇḍukyopaniṣad). An all-encompassing entity or Nirākāra–Niṣkriya-Nirguṇa “Brahman” is imagined but that entity is at a time x and non-x and is not subservient to prayers and worships. Sometimes, this type of all-pervading entity is thought to be a part of monotheism. But, there is no ‘theist’ element (again in the traditional sense) within this school due to the tremendous pressure from atheist Buddhism.
- Cārvāka: Purely materialistic, denying God, afterlife, or soul.
- Bauddha Darśana: In its pragmatic and agnostic essence, also does not accept God, rituals, soul, rebirth by transmigration of souls etc. Some of these supernatural elements were later smuggled into this darsana by the ruling class and revival of Brahminism was responsible for such incorporation of illogical concepts. There is no mention of such concepts in the early Buddhist scriptures. Jataka narratives were created 500/600 years after the death of Buddha. Dharmakirti, one of the noted Buddhist philosophers, questioned: If God created the Universe, then who created God?
- Jaina Darsana: Rejects metaphysics, endorsing a pluralistic view (Anekāntavāda) fostering the politics of non-violence and tolerance.
Despite all these facts of direct negation and different semantics of God, peculiarly enough, some “Indian” philosophers started their treatises by saluting deities. It was nothing but a strategy to hide themselves from the wrath of the rulers, who were guided by casteist discursivity of the Brāhmaṇa Smṛtisaṃtrīṇs, who were guided by their constitution, viz. Manusmṛti. Manus, a group of constitution makers, had banned all types of atheism for the purpose of creating hegemonizing effect along with domination. Manus’ governmentality used ‘dharma’ as a tool for taming the so-called ‘subjects’.
The abnegation of the existence of God or arguing against the belief in God’s existence was part-and-parcel of various Indian philosophical schools, by virtue of which they accordingly developed alternative accounts of the world-process, creation and human life itself.
Now, surpassing the “God question”, what about “deities” as it figures in idolatrous practices of the “Hindu” religion?
Let us go back to Raja Ram Mohan Roy.
In his introductory overview of Īśoponiṣad, Roy stated without any ambivalence:
“The lower mortals perceive God as water. The knowers of deities perceive God in the heavenly bodies. The idiots perceive God in wood and mud; on the other hand, the person-with-wisdom perceives the atman (from small “i” to Big I, i.e., Brahman) as God.”
“Pratika Upāsanā” or symbolic worship was often taken as significant in the context of granting adhikāribheda, i.e., not all are capable to conceptualize a formless, infinite reality like the Brahman, and hence, they resort to idol-worship in which the idol serves as an intermediate or mediating “step” or “ladder” to reach the ultimate divinity. This is what the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda tradition holds, broadly speaking. However, in actual practices of idolatry reminiscent of Pagan worship, the inquiries of worshippers stopped or halted indefinitely with the idol itself, wherein the idol was equated with the God, where the Mṛṇmayī (the idol) was treated as an embodiment of the Cinmayī (the principle of consciousness). This was essentially a poverty of the imagination, a lethargy or idleness of the mind, which even figures in the oaths of the CJI, MP, President, Prime Minister etc., in a “secular” country like India:
“I, (Name), having been appointed Chief Justice (or a Judge) of the Supreme Court of India do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, [that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.”
And again:
“I, (Name), having been elected (or nominated) a member of the House of the People (or the Council of States) do swear in the name of God / solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India and that I will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter.”
And also:
“I, (name), do swear in the name of God (or solemnly affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President (or discharge the functions of the President) of the Republic of India, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law, and that I will devote myself to the service and well-being of the people of the Republic of India.“
What is the necessity, after all, to invoke the “name of God” to take up an officiating role? Why does the personal religious belief figure in holding an office of public duty? Is not this a contradiction within the Constitution, given the much-crucial Article 51A(h) and the Preamble? This idolatry is polymorphic: it makes the state play the god, or the demigod, and the god play the state— as a form of panopticonist witness (Sākṣī Caitanya?!) or surveillance mechanism.
In this context, one remembers a particular citation in Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy (1945)⤡, when he was writing about George Berkeley, who championed the school of subjective idealism (along with solipsistic halting or dealing with egocentric particulars) with the dictum “esse est percipi (aut percipere)”, i.e., to be is to be perceived (or to perceive):
A limerick by Ronald Knox, with a reply,
sets forth Berkeley's theory of material objects:
There was a young man who said, 'God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there’s no one about in the Quad.’
REPLY
Dear Sir :
Your astonishment’s odd
I am always about in the Quad.
And that’s why the tree
Will continue to be.
Since observed by
Yours faithfully,
God. 
Somehow, the assertive role of God as the eternal witness figures in this narrative.
Now, the thing is that this entire “juristic personhood” issue is peculiar to Hindu idols, sculptures and temples alone, given the argument that Churches and Mosques are places for gathering and not the objects of worship in themselves, as mentioned earlier. We would like to ask: how come such physical structures become the object of worship?
Who does not remember Sant Kabir’s lifetime debunking of such incarceration of divinity in narrowed down physical monuments, spaces and structures:
I. 13. mo ko kahân dhûnro bande
O servant, where dost thou seek Me?
Lo! I am beside thee.
I am neither in temple nor in mosque:
I am neither in Kaaba nor in Kailash:
Neither am I in rites and ceremonies,
nor in Yoga and renunciation.
If thou art a true seeker, thou shalt at once see Me:
thou shalt meet Me in a moment of time.
Kabîr says, “O Sadhu! God is the breath of all breath.”
(Trans. Rabindranath Tagore)
Harivansh Rai Bachchan’s poem “Buddh aur Nachghar” had the following lines:
“A man built Temples, Mosques, Churches and locked Him in these.
These are jails for God.“⤡
In the case of “insurance” as well, the “acts of God” such as earthquakes, tsunamis etc., spur a fresh sea of troubles over and above this. One recalls the film “OMG” (2012; Dir. Umesh Shukla) that exposed the utter nonsense of involving Gods or their trustee Godmen/women (business executives, as per this film, given that organized religion in the context of capitalism is nothing other than business) in legal suits.
Furthermore, in a markedly “secular” (not religious, not spiritual; no connection of the state with any religion or religious matter, complete irreligiousity of statist institutions to be upheld, treating religion as a private affair of the individual—- all according to the Indian Constitution as it stands today; however, the European connotation slightly differs from the Indian interpretation of the term “secular” in so far as the latter promote “sarva dharma samobhāva“, i.e., the equality of all religions3, but the separation of state from religious affairs is identifical in both) country like India, it is difficult to see how such a law still holds today, especially in the context of the Hindutvization of all the sectors and institutions of public life in the contemporary times. Given that “God” and even “deity” seem to be empty terms or null classes/sets with no members, how can the scientific, secularized, enlightenment-born gaze of the law not apply Occam’s razor to terminate the usage of these terms in these troubled times in the history of Indian politics, where religious extremism reigns and such a term is being used to aid the religious majoritarianist sentiment while violently annihilating the “othered” religions like Islam? This exact thing has been observed in the Ayodhya dispute and judgement (The substantiated evidence of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa, viz., the videographed record of the Babri Masjid Demolition is widely available, however, the same event was expressly denied in that verdict, contradicting the idea that pratyakṣa hi pramāṇśreṣṭhaḥ), which supported the consolidation of the Ram Temple to aid the Hindutva agenda by creating an open site of vandalism in the course of destroying the Babri Masjid by Hindutva terrorists.
In conclusion (please remember that the following demand is being made at a time when the Indian Republic as governed by a theocratic machinery is trying ‘to be’-come a Hindu Rashtra by obliviating not only plurality of thoughts, opinions or expressions, but also epistemological pursuits, scientific temper and critical logical analysis), on the basis of the above arguments, we demand the deletion of the God or deity (of any religion, for that matter) in any kind of performance of statist, governmental and/or judicial activities.
SOURCE-TEXTS
Juristic Personality of Idols: What’s it all about? VIEW HERE ⤡ (As reported on 6th August, 2020 ©YLCube)
God is not a juristic person, but idol is, says apex court in Ayodhya case VIEW HERE ⤡ (As reported on 20th November, 2019 ©TOI)
The Lord as a juristic person: What legal rights do deities enjoy? VIEW HERE ⤡ (As reported on 4th October, 2019 ©The Indian Express)
https://knowlaw.in/2022/01/07/almighty-juristic-person-rights-of-the-deity/
Comments
Post a Comment